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INTRODUCTION 
By their very nature, land-use management plans are proactive exercises 
requiring public trust in both the capability of experts and the capacity of 
government to achieve a nonmarket-based version of the public good.  In 
recent years, however, public trust in experts and in government has been 
in notably short supply in the United States.  In some quarters, expertise is 
increasingly caricatured as elitism and the capacity of government has been 
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more a punch line than a matter of belief among many Americans.  Such 
negative attitudes have been fed by the popularization of a libertarian 
cultural message,1 the influence of the increasingly powerful financial 
sector,2 the political mobilization of the disaffected and alienated on the 
extremes of the Republican Party,3 and the ascendance of right-wing 
media.4 
In stark contrast to the popular attitudes outlined above, there have been 
increasing calls among academics and professional planners for sustainable 
development, a comprehensive form of land-use management, motivated 
by concerns about metropolitan sprawl and climate change.5  Sustainable 
land-use development can be characterized as “a long term approach to 
decision making, a holistic outlook integrating various disciplines, 
interests, and analytical approaches”6 to the way we envision, allocate, and 
ultimately use land.  To promote sustainable development, a land-use 
management system must incorporate commitments to economic growth, 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. The classic example of the popularization of libertarian thought is found in a 
sentence from Ronald Reagan’s 1981 inaugural address: “In the present crisis, government 
is not the solution to our problem; government is the problem.”  This sentiment appears to 
lie at the core of increasingly negative public assessments of American governance. See, 
e.g., JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE, CONGRESS AS PUBLIC ENEMY: PUBLIC 
ATTITUDES TOWARD AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS (1995). 
 2. See Gautam Mukunda, The Price of Wall Street’s Power, HARV. BUS. REV., June 
2014, at 70-78; see also SIMON JOHNSON & JAMES KWAK, 13 BANKERS: THE WALL STREET 
TAKEOVER AND THE NEXT FINANCIAL MELTDOWN (2011). 
 3. See THEDA SKOCPOL & VANESSA WILLIAMSON, THE TEA PARTY AND THE REMAKING 
OF REPUBLICAN CONSERVATISM (2013); see also JUSTIN GEST, THE NEW MINORITY: WHITE 
WORKING CLASS POLITICS IN AN AGE OF IMMIGRATION AND INEQUALITY (2016); JOHN B. 
JUDIS, THE POPULIST EXPLOSION: HOW THE GREAT RECESSION TRANSFORMED AMERICAN AND 
EUROPEAN POLITICS (2016). 
 4. See Jackie Calmes, They Don’t Give a Damn about Governing: Conservative 
Media’s Influence on the Republican Party, SHORENSTEIN CTR. ON MEDIA, POL. & PUB. 
POL’Y, HARV. U., July 27, 2015, http://shorensteincenter.org/conservative-media-influence-
on-republican-party-jackie-calmes/ [https://perma.cc/X6KV-HP2K]; see also Amy Mitchell 
et. al., Political Polarization & Media Habits, PEW RES. CTR.: JOURNALISM & MEDIA, Oct. 
21, 2014, http://www.journalism.org/2014/10/21/political-polarization-media-habits/ [https:
//perma.cc/Q3KK-XTY3]. 
 5. Columbia University’s Earth Institute and Oxford University’s Environmental 
Change Institute represent just two of the many academic programs focused on sustainable 
development, while the American Planning Association’s decades-long support for smart 
growth initiatives emphasizes the need for sustainable land-use management policies as part 
of a strategy to address both the causes and the impacts of climate change. See, e.g., JEFFREY 
D. SACHS, THE AGE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2015); see also, e.g., Stuart Meck, 
Growing Smart-Legislative Guidebook: Model Statutes for Planning and the Management 
of Change, AM. PLANNING INST. (Jan. 2002), https://www.huduser.gov/Publications/
pdf/growingsmart_guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/UL6E-39B8] (providing an example of the 
sustainability work of the American Planning Association). 
 6. STEPHEN M. WHEELER, PLANNING FOR SUSTAINABILITY: CREATING LIVABLE, 
EQUITABLE, AND ECOLOGICAL COMMUNITIES 34 (2013). 
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intergenerational environmental consciousness, and social equity.7  To 
realize these commitments, sustainable land-use management must take a 
long-term perspective; must rely on the assessments of planning 
professionals; and must include a wide variety of stakeholders in land-use 
decisions.8 
This Article argues that both the underlying values and the political 
processes which define land-use management in the United States act as 
major impediments to any form of sustainable land-use development.  
More specifically, this Article contends that the accepted legal notions of 
private property in the United States, particularly real property, coupled 
with political decisions on governmental land-use regulation, push the 
land-use management system to emphasize individual market values, rather 
than the social implications of market transactions.  In fact, neither the 
values nor the practices surrounding land-use management are necessary 
components of a free-market in real property. 
Following a brief presentation of the philosophical and political bases 
underlying the centrality of private property rights in the United States, Part 
I of this Article distinguishes between and among three approaches to land-
use management—libertarianism, civic republicanism, and the positive 
state model—that have emerged from within the political and cultural 
norms of American society.  Part II analyzes the political forces that led to 
the dominance of the civic republican approach to land-use management in 
the wake of the 1926 Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., ruling.9  
Part III explores the historical tension between private property rights and 
the state police power in American jurisprudence and argues that the 1992 
decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission represented a 
decidedly libertarian legal rebalancing on this issue.10  Part IV examines 
the environmental consequences of trends in American development. 
I.  PROPERTY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS CULTURAL NORMS: 
THE CONTEXT OF LAND-USE MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 
Understanding the context around cultural notions of private property 
and economic development in the United States is essential to explaining 
the political constraints on land-use management.  From the classical 
liberal perspective underlying the American experience, individual 
autonomy and therefore individual rights are inextricably connected to the 
                                                                                                                                         
 7. See SACHS, supra note 5, chs. 1 & 13 (2015). 
 8. See id. ch. 13; see also WHEELER, supra note 6. 
 9. Vill. of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
 10. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
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rights of property.11  The framers of the American Constitution certainly 
acknowledged the centrality of property to their undertaking.12  During the 
debates at the Constitutional Convention, for example, Alexander Hamilton 
spoke to the symbiotic connection between liberty and property: “It was 
certainly true that nothing like an equality of property existed; that an 
inequality would exist as long as liberty existed, and that it would 
unavoidably result from that very liberty itself.”13 Echoing Hamilton, 
Madison in Federalist Number 10 characterized the new government’s 
commitment to private property as primary: “The diversity in the faculties 
of men, from which the rights of private property originate, is not less an 
insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests.  The protection of these 
faculties is the first object of government.”14  Private property rights 
represent more than a complement to individual rights; these rights are 
integral to, and even define, the classical liberal worldview.15 
Reflecting the cultural emphasis on private property, economic 
development in the United States is largely the province of the private 
sector.16  The coupling of well-established private property rights with 
private-sector economic development reflects the libertarian perspective 
that free people operating in free markets will produce the greatest amount 
                                                                                                                                         
 11. See, e.g., CREEL FROMAN, THE TWO AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEMS: SOCIETY, 
ECONOMICS AND POLITICS (1984); see also, e.g., JOSEPH BERTOLINI, THE SERPENT WITHIN: 
POLITICS, LITERATURE AND AMERICAN INDIVIDUALISM (1997); LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL 
TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955). 
 12. See THE FEDERALIST (analyzing factions). 
 13. H. MARK ROELOFS & GERALD HOUSEMAN, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM: 
IDEOLOGY AND MYTH (1983). 
 14. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (emphasis added). 
 15. In analyzing the centrality of property rights to the classical liberal worldview, 
Froman writes: 
Let there be no mistake about it.  Politics is about property; Government is to 
protect property; those who wish change are engaged in a ‘wicked’ project and are 
to be impeded.  Whether you agree or disagree with Madison’s side of the issue is 
not the point.  The point is that Madison is making a very forthright and candid 
statement with respect to what politics is all about—i.e., property. FROMAN, supra 
note 11. 
 16. It is useful to distinguish between economic growth, which relates to GDP size, and 
economic development, which “occurs when individual agents have the opportunity to 
develop the capacities that allow them to actively engage and contribute to the economy.” 
See Maryanne Feldman, et. al, Economic Development: A Definition and Model for 
Investment, U.S. DEP’T OF COM., ECON. DEV. ADMIN., https://www.eda.gov/files/tools/
research-reports/investment-definition-model.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZWC7-QMMT].  The 
authors note the primacy of the private sector in economic development matters but they 
also make note of the vital role that government plays in research and development.  Joseph 
Schumpeter argues that economic development of the kind portrayed in the definition above 
has been driven in the United States largely by the innovation and entrepreneurship of 
private industry. See also JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: 
AN INQUIRY INTO PROFITS, CAPITAL, CREDIT, INTEREST, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE (1961). 
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of total wealth in the most efficient manner possible.17  From within this 
perspective, therefore, government efforts to direct or modify market forces 
obstruct the natural operations of market forces, decrease productive 
efficiency, and are socially injurious, at least in some usually undefined but 
often cited long run.18  One consequence of this philosophy is that the 
federal government’s role in economic development is designed to 
complement market forces entailing “transferring public monies and 
subsidies to corporations to make it profitable for them to do the work that 
the central government wanted done.”19  Government economic 
development initiatives support private sector growth by providing public 
goods such as basic research, infrastructure development, and public 
education as well as by incentivizing selected private market transactions, 
with policies such as the home mortgage interest deduction, the oil 
depletion allowance, and free trade agreements.20 
The market model of economic development sees economic growth as 
an unintended, but natural, consequence of the individual profit motives 
pursued in private transactions between and among property owners.  
Richard Epstein’s characterization of property rights and contracts between 
and among private property owners as a “one-two punch that facilitates the 
economic growth that satisfies human wants” points to the symbiotic 
                                                                                                                                         
 17. FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM 15 (1944) (“The conscious realization 
that the spontaneous and uncontrolled efforts of individuals were capable of producing a 
complex order of economic activities could come only after this development (of libertarian 
practice) had made some progress.”); see also MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND 
FREEDOM (1962); ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, BETWEEN CAPITALISM AND SOCIALISM 5-9 
(1970). 
 18. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET. AL., GOOD CAPITALISM BAD CAPITALISM AND THE 
ECONOMICS OF GROWTH AND PROSPERITY 67-70 (2007) (critically analyzing “the pitfalls of 
state-guided capitalism”); see also GEORGE GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY: A NEW EDITION 
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2012) (analyzing the positive economic development 
outcomes of supply-side economics, as well as a normative defense of capitalism); 
BERTRAND DE JOUVENEL, THE ETHICS OF REDISTRIBUTION xxi-xiii (1990); CHARLES 
MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980 (1984) (analyzing the 
dysfunctions produced by government social policy). 
 19. GARY GERSTLE, LIBERTY AND COERCION: THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 
FROM THE FOUNDING TO THE PRESENT 120 (2015). 
 20. See BAUMOL ET. AL., supra note 18, at 8 (highlighting policies like effective antitrust 
laws and openness to trade and arguing that “in the successful entrepreneurial economy, 
government institutions must ensure that the winning entrepreneurs and the established 
companies (which were launched at earlier times by some entrepreneur) continue to have 
incentives to innovate and grow.”); see also  Feldman et. al. supra note 16, at 12-19.  Much 
of this government sponsored economic development, particularly federal initiatives 
providing incentives to selected industries, seems to be a rejection or at least a modification 
of libertarian values.  This paradox is captured by historian William R. Block’s conclusion 
that “Americans have a unique capacity for living in one world of theory and another of 
practice.” PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK: ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL 20 (1998). 
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connection between such rights and economic development.21  Adam Smith 
succinctly defines the causal connection between individual desires for 
profit and collective economic development as well as the maintenance of 
the larger social order when he writes: “The uniform, constant, and 
uninterrupted effort of every man to better his condition, the principle from 
which [public] and national, as well as private opulence is originally 
derived, is frequently powerful enough to maintain the natural progress of 
things toward improvement.”22  Therefore, to proponents of unfettered 
market processes, economic growth, and development emerge quite 
naturally from the liberal emphasis on individual property rights.23 
A. Land-Use Management: Three Approaches to Markets 
The general consensus that a system grounded in protection of private 
property rights fosters economic development does not mean that there is 
universal agreement on “the conditions under which individuals, 
households and communities can make productive use of their assets and 
appropriate their returns.”24  Indeed, reflecting other controversies 
surrounding the actual practice as opposed to the general philosophy of 
governance in the United States, there are three  contrasting perspectives on 
land-use regulation—a libertarian view, a civic republican view, and a 
positive state model.25  A libertarian perspective believes that a land-use 
policy guided by an emphasis on affording property owners the maximum 
possible autonomy in the use and transference of their real-property 
protects individual liberty, diminishes tendencies toward discrimination in 
the real estate market, and results in optimal social uses of real property.26   
                                                                                                                                         
 21. Richard A. Epstein, Deliberative Democracy at Zero Prices, 136 DEADULUS 67 
(2007). 
 22. See generally Adam Smith, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 373 (2000 ed.). 
 23. See generally Stijn Claessens & Luc Laeven, Financial Development, Property 
Rights, and Growth, 58 J. OF FIN., 2401, (2003); see also Armen A. Alchian, Property Rights, 
in THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECON. (David R. Henderson ed. 2013), 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PropertyRights.html [https://perma.cc/5AMT-5KPF]. 
 24. See generally Mike Dennison & Robyn Klingler-Vidra, Annotated Bibliography for 
Rapid Review on Property Rights, LSE ENTERPRISE (2012), https://partnerplatform.org/
?tcafmd80 [https://perma.cc/PF5P-7TVR]; see also Epstein, supra note 21 at 67. 
 25. Political tensions over economic policy are as old as the Republic.  They were 
evident in: the debates between Federalists and Republicans, specifically Hamilton and 
Jefferson, over the Federal Government’s economic role at the founding; the arguments over 
the National Bank during the Jackson era and beyond; the political conflicts involved in the 
regulatory and conservation policies of the early twentieth century; the battles over the New 
Deal to Great Society’s efforts at proactive governance; and the debates in recent years over 
supply-siders plans to reemphasize markets and deemphasize the impact of formal 
governance. 
 26. See generally Epstein, supra note 21; see also Alchian, supra note 23. 
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A civic republican perspective broadens the implications of real property 
ownership to include “local communities” in a network of private property 
actors.27  From this perspective, because land-use matters have social 
implications, they require regulation by local governments, as opposed to 
the laissez-faire market approach favored by libertarians.28  Lastly, a 
positive state perspective broadens the nature and sweep of the concept of 
communities in its analysis of property rights.29  From this perspective, 
because land-use matters have implications beyond the local communities 
within which they are housed, these policies need to be regulated by state 
or national governments, in the interest of a larger common good than that 
envisioned by civic republicans.30  Table 1 distinguishes between 
libertarian, civic republican, and positive state approaches on a variety of 
social values and political strategies related to land-use management. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
 27. See generally George Hornsey & Mildred Warner, Cities and Sustainability: 
Polycentric Action And Municipal Governance, 51(1) URB. AFF. REV. 46, 46-73 (2015); see 
also Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global 
Environmental Change, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 550 (2010) 
 28. See generally Vincent Ostrom, Charles Tiebout & Robert Warren, The Organization 
of Government In Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV., 831 
(1961). 
 29. See generally Lum T. Fobi, Dealing with Dysfunction in the Nation’s Increasingly 
Obsolete System for Land Use Management: Guidance from the Past for State-Coordinated 
Planning and Decision-Making, (May 2012) (M.A. thesis, Tufts University); see also 
Rebecca Lewis & Gerrit-Jan Knapp, Institutional Structures for State Growth Management: 
An Examination of State Development Plans, 44(1) ST. AND LOC. GOV’T REV. 33, 33-34 
(2012). 
 30. For an analysis of state level land-use management models, see Meck, supra note 5; 
see also Lewis & Knapp, supra note 29.  For an analysis of federal level land-use 
management models, see Jayne E. Daly, A glimpse of the past—A vision for the future: 
Senator Henry M. Jackson and national land-use legislation, 28(1) URB. LAW. 7 (1996); see 
also Landon G. Rockwell, The planning function of the National Resources Planning Board, 
12 J. OF POL. 169 (1945); M.L. Wilson, The report on land of the National Resources Board, 
17(1) J. OF FARM ECON. 39 (1935). 
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Table 1:  Three Approaches to Land-Use Planning 
 Libertarian Planning 
Civic 
Republication 
Planning 
Positive State 
Planning 
Notion of 
Property 
Rights 
The use and 
transference of 
real property is 
the exclusive 
province of an 
individual 
property owner 
The use of real 
property lies 
within the 
province of a 
local network of 
ownership; 
property 
transference is 
the province of 
an individual 
owner 
The use of real 
property lies within 
the province of a 
state, national or 
global network of 
ownership; 
property 
transference is the 
province of an 
individual owner 
Social 
Values Market efficiency Community input Social equity 
View of the 
Market Self-regulating 
Requires local 
parameters 
Requires at least 
regional 
parameters 
Primary 
Fear 
Distortion of 
market forces by 
planning 
Imposition of one 
size fits all 
models of 
planning 
The tragedy of the 
commons 
Spatial 
and 
Temporal 
Focus 
Limited to 
immediate 
market 
transactions 
Broadened to 
proximate 
community 
concerns 
Extended to the 
longer time frames 
of regional, 
national, and/or 
global stakeholders 
Locus of 
Public 
Authority 
Reactive 
authority through 
the courts 
Proactive 
authority through 
local government 
Proactive authority 
through state 
and/or national 
governments 
Planning 
and 
Strategy 
Nuisance rulings 
Development of 
community-based 
“neighborliness” 
Development of 
regional, state, 
and/or national 
plans 
Vertical 
Policy 
Integration 
Not relevant Not necessary 
Recommended or 
mandatory part of 
planning 
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B. The Libertarian Market Model of Land-Use “Management” 
The libertarian perspective emerges from classical liberalism and 
reinforces the cultural notion of individualism in the United States.31  To 
libertarians, the concept of private in the phrase private property is virtually 
sacrosanct, particularly when applied to real property.32  In legal terms, 
Blackstone’s common law definition of private property as “that sole and 
despotic dominion which one man claims over the external things of the 
world, in total exclusion of the rights of any other individual in the 
universe” clearly makes this point.33  From this perspective, ownership 
provides an individual with unfettered control over some object, in this 
case land as well as all the natural resources and structures associated with 
the land.34  This physical dominion means that an owner has the exclusive 
rights of use and transference of the property, within the limits of law.  The 
right of use includes direct personal use, income-generating applications, 
and development activities designed to improve the property.35  The right 
of transference includes an owner’s ability to sell, lease, or otherwise profit 
from the conveyance of the title to another party.36 
The first rule of libertarian land-use management is for government to 
“do no harm,” by protecting the private ownership rights to real property as 
well as the efficient market transactions that result from protection of these 
rights.37  Libertarian planning (perhaps observing is a better term) focuses 
on the short-term efficiency of wealth production through market 
processes.38  From this perspective, real property markets, like markets 
generally, should be self-regulating mechanisms that adapt and adjust 
themselves according to the natural laws of classical economics.39  
                                                                                                                                         
 31. For analyses of the philosophical origins of modern libertarian thought in classical 
liberalism, see RAYMOND PLANT, MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT, chs. 2-3 (1991); see also 
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); see also ROBERT 
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974); LINDA J. MEDCALF & KENNETH M. 
DOLBEARE, NEOPOLITICS: AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEAS IN THE 1980S 43-45 (1985). . 
 32. See RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS (1985); see also WENDELL COX, WAR ON THE 
DREAM: HOW ANTI-SPRAWL POLICY THREATENS THE QUALITY OF LIFE (2006). 
 33. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1765-1769) 
BOOK 2, CHAPTER 1, http://lonang.com/library/reference/blackstone-commentaries-law-
england/bla-201/ [https://perma.cc/BEU3-EWYG]. 
 34. See generally Alchian, supra note 23. 
 35. See id. 
 36. See id. 
 37. See generally COX, supra note 32; see also Fred Siegel, Is Regional Government the 
Answer?, 137 PUB. INT. 85, 91 (1999). 
 38. For a general philosophical assertion of this principle, see HAYEK, supra note 17; see 
also FRIEDMAN, supra note 17. For an analysis of this perspective pertaining specifically to 
planning, see EPSTEIN, supra note 32; see also COX, supra note 32. 
 39. For an analysis of the natural operations of market systems, see FRIEDRICH HAYEK, 
LAW, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY (Routledge 1976); see also Paul G. Mahoney, The 
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Government efforts to formulate or implement land-use plans disturb 
efficient operation of the market.40  In line with these libertarian views, 
Economist Armen Alchian raises the “interesting paradox” that although 
we characterize property as private, assessments of a property’s value and 
ultimately its use are usually “based on public, or social, evaluation.”41  It 
is worth noting, however, that from the libertarian perspective, such social 
evaluations of value are themselves grounded in the same philosophical 
and institutional frameworks that reflect and reaffirm a notably narrow 
emphasis on individual self-interest. 
If there are any negative externalities to market transactions governing 
land-use, proponents of libertarian planning believe that they should be 
addressed in the courts, rather than through government oversight.42  To 
libertarians, legal mechanisms such as nuisance laws sufficiently minimize 
externalities by allowing parties negatively impacted by another’s actions 
to challenge a particular land-use practice as injurious to the use or 
enjoyment of their own property.43  In suggesting that government 
authority be employed by the judicial branch only after some “harm” is 
explicitly alleged, the libertarian view is classically reactive in terms of 
public authority.44  To libertarians, land-use planning is best left to market 
forces generating the most efficient uses of land and the government’s role 
is to first reaffirm these market forces, and then react to negative 
externalities if and only if they are brought to the attention of the courts.45  
C. The Civic Republican Complementary Model of Land-Use 
Management 
The civic republican approach envisions land-use management as an 
accommodation of market forces with local community values, in a process 
which is best described as neighborly.46  From this perspective, it is critical 
that the community values forming the context for land-use management be 
reflected in and implemented by local government.  This is because it is the 
level of government closest to the people, and local officials, that best 
                                                                                                                                         
Common Law and Economic Growth: Hayek Might Be Right, 30 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 503 
(2001). 
 40. See generally COX, supra note 32; see also Siegel, supra note 37. 
 41. Alchian, supra note 23. 
 42. See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and 
Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681 (1973). 
 43. See id.; Mahoney, supra note 39, 503-25. 
 44. See Ellickson, supra note 42. 
 45. See id.; Mahoney, supra note 39, at 503-525. 
 46. See, e.g., BARRY CULLINGWORTH & ROGER CAVES, PLANNING IN THE USA: POLICIES, 
ISSUES, AND PROCESSES 97-160 (4th ed. 2014); see also MEL SCOTT, AMERICAN CITY 
PLANNING SINCE 1890 (1969). 
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understands the needs of the local community.47  Civic republicans argue 
that efforts to include larger units of government with broader concerns in 
the local land-use process will result in one-size-fits-all bureaucratic 
mandates that may not accurately reflect local interests.48 
Unlike their libertarian counterparts, civic republicans acknowledge that 
there is a proactive land-use management role for local government that is 
rooted in state police power.49  The police power is based in the Tenth 
Amendment and is generally defined as the right of the states to make laws 
governing health, welfare, morals and general welfare in a community.50  
Civic republicans support state delegation of police powers in a wide 
variety of policy areas including land-use management to local 
governments.51  It is worth noting here that because local governments are 
permitted to exercise authority only in those matters expressly delegated to 
them by their state governments, state governments can reassume land-use 
management authority by empowering state-level regulatory agencies.  
However, most governors and legislatures attempting to do so would face 
strong political opposition from affected groups in their localities.52 
D. The Positive-State Model of Land-Use Management 
Proponents of positive-state land-use management view private property 
in a broader and more nuanced context than their civic republican 
counterparts.53  From this perspective, ownership of real property has 
                                                                                                                                         
 47. See Ostrom, supra note 27, at 550-57; Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren, supra note 28, at 
831-42; PIETRO S. NIVOLA, LAWS OF THE LANDSCAPE: HOW POLICIES SHAPE CITIES IN 
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 48. See George C. Homsy & Mildred E. Warner, Cities and Sustainability: Polycentric 
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supra note 27, at 550-57; see also Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren, supra note 28, at 831-42. 
 49. See CULLINGWORTH & CAVES, supra note 46, at 97-160; see also SCOTT, supra note 
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 50. The Tenth Amendment states that: “The Powers not delegated to the United States 
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.  For analysis of the Amendment’s impact on the 
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 51. See Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren, supra note 28, at 841. 
 52. See Richard Briffault, Principal Provisions of State Constitutions: A Brief Overview, 
in THE NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION: A BRIEFING BOOK 33-34 (Gerald Benjamin ed., 
1994); see also Richard Briffault, Home Rule, Majority Rule, and Dillon’s Rule, 67 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 1011, 1011-1024 (1991). 
 53. See, e.g., Fobi, supra note 29; Lewis & Knapp, supra note 29, at 33-44; ERIC T. 
FREYFOGLE, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY: FINDING COMMON GROUND ON THE OWNERSHIP OF 
LAND (2007) [hereinafter FREYFOGLE, ON PRIVATE PROPERTY]; ERIC T. FREYFOGLE, THE 
LAND WE SHARE: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE COMMON GOOD, (2nd ed. 2003) [hereinafter 
FREYFOGLE, THE LAND WE SHARE]; Craig Anthony Arnold, The Reconstitution of Property: 
Property as a Web of Interests, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 281 (2002); Jayne E. Daly, supra 
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implications for a wider range of people than those in the local community, 
as well as for the object owned.54  On an immediate level, for example, this 
complexity derives from property owners’ interactions with lenders, 
insurers, tax assessors, etc., all of whom have or can have some claim on 
the value and use of the property in question.55 
Such interactions are reflected in property scholar Craig Anthony 
Arnold’s notion of property as a “web of interests,” which he defines as “a 
set of interconnections among persons, groups, and entities each with some 
stake in an identifiable . . . object, which is at the center of the web.”56  
From this perspective, because real property ownership is a highly 
integrated social reality, decisions about use of the land have broader and 
more complex implications for a wider variety of property stakeholders 
than can be addressed by the civic republican reliance land-use 
management through local governments.  Since the impacts of private land-
use and local planning may stretch well beyond a single locality, the 
governing authority in charge must be accountable to a wider range of 
stakeholders than local political interests.  Positive statists therefore 
contend that land-use management plans must be formulated, if not 
implemented, by units of government larger than those with only local 
jurisdiction.57 
II.  AMERICAN LAND-USE MANAGEMENT IN PRACTICE 
Positive-state proponents do not necessarily promote one-size-fits-all 
plans; rather they support having state and federal agencies develop 
somewhat flexible land-use plans, to guide local governments in 
developing their own plans.58  For example, Daniel Fiorino suggests a 
“mixed scanning” legislative approach to planning which affords both state 
and local officials a wide variety of strategic options connected to local 
                                                                                                                                         
note 30, at 7-39; Rockwell, supra note 30, at 169-78 (1945); Wilson, supra note 30, at 39-
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 54. See Arnold, supra note 53, at 281-334. 
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 56. Arnold, supra note 53, at 333. 
 57. See generally Paola Plevak, A More Sustainable Urban Living in the United States, 
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 58. For variations in state planning models, see generally DANIEL J. FIORINO, THE NEW 
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION (2006); see also MARGARET JANE RADIN, 
REINTERPRETING PROPERTY (1993). 
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needs when formulating and implementing land-use regulations.59  
Generally, positive statists envision overarching state or national 
government guidelines that incorporate a broad range of stakeholders, 
while maintaining local implementation of state-formulated land-use 
plans.60  Moreover, by locating the authority to formulate land-use plans in 
state or national levels of  government, positive state policies require not 
only vertical integration of state and local agencies but also the horizontal 
integration of local agencies from different communities whose 
jurisdictions may be impacted by each community’s land-use decisions.61 
The next two sections of this Article examine the actual practice of land-
use management in the United States.  The first section examines the 
origins of modern American land-use management in two pieces of model 
federal legislation: the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (“SZEA”) and 
the Standard City Planning Enabling Act (“SCPEA”) issued in the wake of 
the 1926 Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. decision, which affirmed 
the government’s right to implement zoning regulation.62  The analysis in 
this section suggests that as a consequence of the states following these two 
federal guidelines, land-use management has reflected a civic republican 
approach to planning and zoning that ensures property owners the most 
narrowly-defined, and consequently, the least intrusive form of government 
regulation of their property.  The following section analyzes the history of 
legal efforts to address the tensions between individual property rights and 
state police powers on land-use matters.  The analysis suggests that, in its 
1992 Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council decision, the Supreme 
Court rebalanced the relationship between the exercise of state police 
powers and the protection of individual property rights in favor of property 
owners.63 
                                                                                                                                         
 59. FIORINO, supra note 58, at 218-20. 
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A. American Land-Use Management: A Civic Republican Emphasis 
A defining and on-going issue in a federalist system is deciding what 
level of government will be charged with what responsibilities.  In the 
wake of the 1926 Euclid decision affirming the government’s authority to 
manage land-use through zoning, the nature and degree of government 
involvement in land-use management became an open issue.64  While the 
Court’s ruling that the Village of Euclid’s zoning regulations were a 
legitimate exercise of public authority was a major victory for those who 
supported regulating private use of real property, it was not necessarily a 
victory for either the Village of Euclid or other local governments.  This 
was because the police power referenced in Euclid is the state 
government’s plenary authority, which left state officials to decide how and 
by whom this authority would be exercised.65  In other words, the decision 
gave state officials the opportunity to decide whether land-use management 
policy would reflect a civic republican or a positive state approach. 
The process of state allocation of policy responsibilities to local 
jurisdictions is governed by a judicial norm commonly referred to as 
Dillon’s Rule.66  Under the aegis of Dillon’s Rule, local governments are 
strictly limited to exercising those powers state officials expressly 
delegated to them.  Unlike the dual sovereignty relationship between the 
national and state governments, local governments are creatures of their 
states and are therefore subject to state government authority.67  In facing 
the post-Euclid world, therefore, state officials had several options for 
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Dillon’s Rule, supra note 52, at 1011-24. 
 67. See generally Briffault, Principal Provisions of State Constitutions, supra note 52; 
see also Briffault, Home Rule, Majority Rule, and Dillon’s Rule, supra note 52, at 1011-24. 
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managing land-use.  Adopting a positive state perspective, they could have 
placed all land-use functions in the hands of state agencies, or they could 
have developed a mixed system where state officials formulated general 
guidelines for land-use management and local officials were granted 
discretion in applying these guidelines.  Alternatively, following the civic 
republican model, state officials could have simply delegated land-use 
management responsibilities to their local governments.  By 1930, thirty-
five states had delegated their land-use authority to local governments68 
and by 1979 all fifty states had done so.69 
These decisions to delegate state land-use powers to local governments 
were directly influenced by two pieces of model legislation developed by 
the Department of Commerce.  In 1926, the Department, under the 
direction of Secretary Herbert Hoover, produced the SZEA, followed by 
the SCPEA in 1928.70   While acknowledging that the police power resides 
in state governments, the SZEA advised that local government agencies 
exercise zoning authority and be the venue for appeals and reconsideration 
of zoning regulations.71  Although the SZEA provided for a five-mile 
zoning outreach into unincorporated areas, it was quite clear that the 
authority to zone should be delegated to “the legislative body of cities and 
incorporated villages.”72  Moreover, the SZEA recommended that local 
zoning decisions be based on land-use plans developed and maintained by 
local authorities.73  To assist officials with this task, the SCPEA outlined in 
some detail the planning model local governments ought to follow in 
setting up, empowering, staffing, and working with their planning 
departments.74 
Since the Court had ruled in Euclid that land-use outcomes did not have 
to be left to the natural patterns of real-property markets or the reactive 
regulation of the common law, the next best alternative, from a libertarian 
perspective at least, was for these decisions to be in the hands of local 
governments.75  The model statutes proposed by the Commerce 
                                                                                                                                         
 68. See Ruth Knack, Stuart Meck & Israel Stollman, The Real Story Behind the 
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Department were designed to encourage a civic republican approach to 
land-use management largely because such an approach is less of a 
regulatory burden on property owners than a positive state model would be. 
To trace this reasoning, it is helpful to address the state of national 
politics during the Euclid period.  The Republican Regime that began with 
Warren Harding’s ascendance to the Presidency in 1921 and ended with 
Herbert Hoover’s defeat in the election of 1932 was notably pro-market 
and anti-regulation.76  Indeed, the libertarian nature of this regime was in 
stark contrast to the previous two Republican presidencies of Theodore 
Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, which had institutionalized the 
regulatory powers of the national government in a host of policy areas, 
including placing vast tracks of land in federal preserves.77  Republican 
Presidents from 1921 to 1932, however, were more responsive to the 
business wing of their party than to the demands of the Progressive forces 
that had been influential earlier in the century, and this responsiveness to 
business interests had a number of policy impacts.78  Republican appointees 
to positions on federal regulatory agencies evidenced notably pro-business 
and anti-regulatory attitudes;79 by 1928, the marginal federal tax rate on 
upper-income earners went down by a nearly fifty percentage point 
difference from its level in 1921;80 and federal support was withdrawn for 
public land-use initiatives such as dam construction projects in Muscle 
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Shoals that would ultimately be reinstated as part of the Tennessee Valley 
Authority created during Franklin Roosevelt’s Administration.81  And for 
the first time ever, the 1928 Republican Party National Platform included a 
“home rule” section that highlighted the libertarian bent of the party in 
those years in its statement that: “There is a real need of restoring the 
individual and local sense principles; there is a real need of restoring the 
individual and local sense of responsibility and self-reliance.”82  In short, 
this twelve-year Republican Regime was more inclined to support business 
interests with favorable tax policies and less likely to favor government 
regulatory action, over land-use development or much of anything else, 
than either Roosevelt or Taft.83 
The analysis here suggests that this libertarian bent in Washington, D.C. 
was very much in evidence in the response to the Euclid decision’s 
legitimation of government’s authority to regulate private property rights 
through zoning.84  Officials in the Department of Commerce charged with 
developing model zoning and planning statutes for use in the states had two 
basic options available to them: a statist choice that would have advised 
states to locate land-use management authority at the state level of 
government, or a civic republican approach that would have encouraged 
states to delegate land-use responsibility to their local governments.  The 
option selected represented a civic republican commitment to zoning and 
planning by local levels of government.85  From a libertarian perspective, 
the intent of the SZEA and the SCPEA seems clear: if private-property 
rights were to be modified by zoning regulations, as the Euclid decision 
affirmed that they could be, then the modifications should be as narrow and 
as non-intrusive as possible.86  And this purpose could best be 
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accomplished by empowering local and not state governments to manage 
land-use in their communities.87 
Political decisions about where policy responsibility lies result in the 
development of policy networks composed of participants who attach 
themselves to a particular policy area, at whatever level of government is 
charged with a specific policy responsibility.88  These policy networks 
reflect and reinforce what E.E. Schattschneider calls the “scope and bias of 
the pressure system” that defines any particular policy area in the United 
States.89  In the case of land-use management, where authority was 
delegated early on to local governments, policy networks have formed 
around local agencies dramatically limiting the range of stakeholders 
involved in land management issues.  In so doing, local land-use authority 
prioritizes the economic and political interests of individual property 
owners and business interests in the local community.90  As one example, 
the efforts of suburban communities in the Northeast and Midwest to avoid 
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 90. See HERBERT J. GANS, THE LEVITTOWNERS: WAYS OF LIFE AND POLITICS IN A 
SUBURBAN COMMUNITY (1967); James C. Clingermayer, Electoral Representation, Zoning 
Politics, and the Exclusion of Group Homes, 47 POL. RES. Q. 969, 979 (1994). 
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annexation by the large cities in their regions and to instead be incorporated 
as local government entities can be traced to the desire of local 
stakeholders to control taxation and land-use in these communities.91  
Moreover, these efforts by local property owners were strongly supported 
by housing developers, who were a crucial component of the policy 
networks that emerged in suburban communities of that time.92  Indeed, 
housing developers “were not merely the builders of homes; they were 
‘community builders’ interested in shaping the character of entire 
neighborhoods.”93 
It is this type of community-based political insulation that emerged from 
local control of land-use management that so disturbs positive statists.  
Whereas statewide planning considers the impact of local plans on 
neighboring communities, the region where the community is located, and 
often the state as a whole, local plans usually consider no geographically 
wider area of concern than the impact of plans on a particular community.94  
While state planning increases the range of stakeholders involved in the 
planning process, local planning limits relevant stakeholders to residents 
and business owners in the local community.95  Moreover, having to assess 
regional and statewide impacts of necessity considers longer-term land-use 
time horizons, while local planning focuses on the immediate land-use 
effects in one community.96  In short, positive statists argue that statewide 
planning would provide at least the opportunity for a wider, deeper, and 
longer-term land-use plan.  More to the point of the present analysis, 
however, statewide planning with its wider variety of stakeholders, myriad 
of spatial concerns, and longer time horizons more dramatically modifies 
private property rights by increasing the sweep of land-use regulations 
much more than a does a narrowly focused system of local planning. 
B. American Land-Use Management: A Libertarian Rebalance 
This section explores the historical tension between the police powers of 
the state and the rights of individual property owners.  This issue is 
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explored through a historical analysis of Supreme Court cases doctrine.  
State governments directly regulate a variety of private sector activities in 
addition to land-use.97  The following analysis emphasizes the Court’s 
decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, which involved a 
direct challenge by a property owner to a state environmental policy that he 
claimed was detrimental to his property interests.98 
Since 1897, when Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. City of 
Chicago incorporated the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause into the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, the federal judiciary has 
constrained the capacity of state and local governments to implement land 
management plans that have negative impacts on individual property 
owners.99  Indeed, this 1897 decision was the first example of incorporation 
in American legal history—a case-by-case process where the Court applies 
the restrictions that the Bill of Rights imposes on the national government 
to the states as well.100 
In the wake of the Chicago Burlington decision, the central question 
concerning state land-use regulation became: when does the police power 
of the states intrude on the Fifth Amendment right of property owners to 
the use of, or compensation for, their land?  This legal constraint on state 
police powers became more restrictive after the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.101  To introduce the argument, 
it is useful to examine three perspectives that the federal courts have used 
in their rulings on the takings issue.  The first perspective asserted positive 
state values by affirming the authority of the police powers of the state; the 
second struck a case-by-case balance between state authority and the 
protection of property rights; and a third more libertarian perspective 
privileged the protection of property rights in the face of state police power.  
Table 2 provides an outline of the historical evolution of the three 
perspectives, to trace how the legal balance between state police power and 
individual property rights under the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
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Amendment moved toward a libertarian-friendly protection of property 
rights. 
Table 2:  Legal Evolution of State Police Powers and Property Rights 
 Positive State Civic Republican Libertarian 
Historical 
Evolution 
Colonial period 
through 1897 
1920s 
through 1992 1992 to present 
Legal 
Grounding 
State police 
power 
State police 
power as 
delegated and 
impact on 
investment 
expectations 
For state police powers 
negating all the value 
of property—nuisance 
Political 
Values 
Protect 
community 
against harm 
Balance 
between 
community 
harm and 
property 
owner rights 
Balance weighed 
toward property owner 
Burden of 
Proof 
On the property 
owner 
Variable—
case-by-case On the government 
Sample 
Cases 
Mugler v. 
Kansas, 123 U.S. 
623 (1887) 
Penn Central 
v. New York 
City, 438 
U.S. 104 
(1978) 
Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal 
Commission, 505 U.S. 
1003 (1992) 
Basis of 
Adjudication 
“The existence of 
facts supporting 
legislative 
judgment to be 
presumed.” 
(United States 
v. Carolene 
Products 
Co., 304 U.S. 
144, 152 (1938), 
cited by Justice 
Blackmun in 
Lucas. 
“If regulation 
goes too far, 
it will be 
recognized as 
a taking.” 
(Pennsylvani
a Coal v. 
Mahon 260 
U.S. 393, 415 
(1922)). 
“A law or decree with 
such effect must . . . do 
no more than duplicate 
the result that could 
have been achieved in 
the courts . . . under the 
State’s law of private 
nuisance, or by the 
State under its . . . 
power to abate 
nuisances that affect 
the public generally, or 
otherwise” 
(Lucas, 505 U.S. at 
1030). 
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First, guided by Justice Stone’s maxim that “the existence of facts 
supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed,”102 courts afforded 
state officials wide discretion to determine reasonable land-use regulation 
as an extension of valid police power.103  This perspective is found in the 
1887 case, Mugler v. Kansas, where the Court ruled that the state had no 
obligation to compensate a landowner for economic loss suffered when a 
public regulation rendered his property unusable, as long as the regulation 
was meant to prevent serious public harm.104  As Justice Harlan noted, 
“such legislation does not disturb the owner in the control or use of his 
property for lawful purposes, nor restrict his right to dispose of it, but is 
only a declaration by the State that its use by any one, for certain forbidden 
purposes, is prejudicial to the public interests.”105  From this legal 
viewpoint, the police powers of the state trumped the claim to a taking by 
an individual property owner. 
There were precedents in American history for such a broad 
interpretation of the state police power.106  John F. Hart, for example, 
contends that colonial and early state legislatures, whose laws preceded the 
Takings Clause in the Fifth Amendment and therefore establish one basis 
for determining what the clause was intended to mean, enacted a variety of 
constraints on the use of real property above and beyond the existence of 
nuisance claims.107  Colonial and state legislatures often compelled 
landowners to develop their land, drain wetlands, and even attend to 
aesthetic issues.108 
A second legal perspective sought to establish a judicial balance between 
the state’s police power and individual property rights under the Takings 
Clause.  This view is based in large part on Justice Holmes’ admonition in 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon that “if regulation goes too far it will be 
recognized as a taking.”109  With Holmes’ admonition in mind, the Court 
attempted to strike a balance in Penn Cent. Transp. v. New York City, when 
New York City’s Landmark Preservation Commission prevented the 
owners of Penn Central Transportation from utilizing the air rights they 
held to construct a building above Grand Central Terminal, which had been 
designated as a City Landmark Building.110  Penn Central Transportation 
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sued under the Taking Clause of the Fifth Amendment, but the Court ruled 
that the economic impact of the Landmarks Preservation Commission 
decision on Penn Central did not interfere with either the normal operations 
of business or reasonable investor expectations.111  In his opinion, Justice 
Brennan advocated for a case-by-case approach to the takings question, 
balancing the impact of the government’s action on the individual plaintiff 
with the larger public purpose of the action.112  Justice Brennan identified 
three factors courts should weigh when making determinations about 
whether government regulation represented a taking under the Fifth 
Amendment: the economic impact of the regulation, investor expectations, 
and the character of the government action.113  Noting that in the past “this 
court has upheld land-use regulations that destroyed or adversely impacted 
recognized real property interests,” Justice Brennan offered a powerful 
reminder about the political stakes involved in deciding takings issues: 
“Government hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to 
property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in 
the general law.”114 
The third more libertarian perspective abandoned Justice Brennan’s 
balancing test, at least for some cases, and afforded more deference to 
individual property owners.  This perspective drops the inquiry into the 
character of the government’s action that Justice Brennan referenced, and 
only allows government regulations to negate full property value for the 
narrow purpose of preventing nuisance.  From this perspective, the Court 
has afforded the legal notion of nuisance a “special status” in takings 
cases.115  As a consequence, individual real property rights outweigh state 
police powers with respect to the Takings Clause on regulations that 
deprive an owner of all economic use of a property, unless the nuisance 
exception applies. 
The Court’s assertion of this third position is found in Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council.  Having concluded that development of 
beachfront housing threatened to exacerbate the state’s already significant 
problem with beach erosion, the South Carolina Legislature enacted the 
Beachfront Management Act of 1988.116  The law sought to manage 
development of beachfront property to maintain beach areas as storm 
barriers, habitats for animals and vegetation, a “natural health 
                                                                                                                                         
 111. See id. at 131 & 136. 
 112. Id. at 124. 
 113. See id. 
 114. Id. (citing Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. at 413). 
 115. Hart, supra note 106, at 1254-55. 
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environment” and a basis for the tourism industry.117  Prohibited by this 
law from constructing houses on two beachfront properties he owned, 
David Lucas sued, contending that the prohibition amounted to a taking 
under the Fifth Amendment.118  Although the trial court agreed with Lucas, 
the South Carolina Supreme Court overturned the lower court’s decision, 
finding that a regulatory prohibition placed on Lucas’s use of his 
beachfront property by the state law was a valid exercise of the state’s 
police powers.119  The United States Supreme Court then heard Lucas’s 
appeal.120 
Rejecting the South Carolina Supreme Court’s ruling, the U.S. Supreme 
Court ordered the state to compensate Lucas for what amounted to a taking 
of his land.121  Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia rejected the South 
Carolina Supreme Court’s conclusion that title to land is held subject to the 
“implied limitation” that a state’s interest in protecting “health, safety, 
morals, or general welfare” through exercising its police powers may result 
in a situation where the property in question loses all economic value.122  
The Court ruled that the notion of such an “‘implied limitation’ . . . is 
inconsistent with the historical compact recorded in the Takings Clause that 
has become part of our constitutional culture.”123  Therefore, any state law 
that completely negates the value of real property constitutes a taking 
unless it replicates the legal outcome that would have emerged under the 
“State’s law of private nuisance.”124 
Under such interpretations, statutes and regulations that limit private use 
of land in the interest of some larger social goal, e.g., prohibiting 
development of wetlands, are always suspect.  Indeed, in cases where 
landowners suffer loss of the full value of their property, state restrictions 
must pass the strictest test, i.e., the nuisance test, to avoid violating the 
Takings Clause.125  In so ruling, the Court overturned the tripartite test 
from Penn Central.126  By substituting the nuisance rule, Lucas rejected the 
notion that the character of the government’s action, even if it protected a 
legitimate community interest, must be part of the legal equation when 
determining if a taking has occurred. 
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There is a clear trend in the Court’s decisions towards a more libertarian 
judicial perspective on property protection under the Takings Clause.  
Following an extended period of time characterized by a presumption of 
state authority to regulate land-use in the public interest and another period 
where the character of state interests was essential in deciding the validity 
of regulatory actions, the Court moved in Lucas to a position where, in at 
least some cases, the character of state interests is no longer even 
considered.127  This evolution in legal philosophy, particularly with 
reference to the facts in the Lucas case, has important implications for 
environmental efforts to mitigate the impacts of climate change.  State 
agencies, charged with protecting coastline populations from the rising 
tides and flood threats associated with climate change, must now heed 
whether or not the state treasury can afford the potential costs incurred 
under a Takings Clause action when they consider coastal land-use 
regulations.  For example, state agencies must account for these expenses 
before mandating the removal of existing structures or prohibiting new 
structures on compromised beach areas or wetlands, regulations that by 
their very nature diminish property values and negatively impact property 
owners.  In cases like this, state government may indeed “go on,” but it 
must do so with regulatory timidity that belies the nature of the increasing 
threat.128 
Furthermore, courts may have difficulty applying Lucas’ categorical test, 
grounded in the principle that a state law negating one hundred percent of a 
property’s value is a taking unless it replicates the result of a nuisance 
action.  Short of overturning Lucas, future courts may well face the issue of 
why a property owner who loses less than full value does not also merit 
categorical protection under the Takings Clause.  As Justice Stevens 
observed in his dissent in Lucas, “the Court’s new rule is wholly arbitrary.  
A landowner whose property is diminished in value 95 percent recovers 
nothing, while an owner whose property is diminished 100 percent recovers 
the land’s full value.”129  Faced with such choices, a future court may well 
decide to extend the Lucas ruling in the only mathematical direction it can 
go and set the categorical test for a taking somewhere below one hundred 
percent of a property’s value, encouraging even more timid state regulatory 
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behavior, and belying yet again the extent of the increasing threats of 
climate change. 
III.  CONSEQUENCES OF CIVIC REPUBLICAN LAND-USE MANAGEMENT 
AND LIBERTARIAN COURT DECISIONS 
All public policy decisions, including those originating in the courts, 
have intended and unintended consequences.  Although it would be an 
overstatement to blame today’s problems of metropolitan sprawl and 
climate change solely on the delegation of land-use management to local 
governments, it is fair to argue that local control of land-use helped create 
and continues to exacerbate these problems.130  In order to make this 
argument, it is first necessary to describe the connections between 
metropolitan sprawl and population density. 
Metropolitan sprawl is low-density development “beyond the outermost 
boundaries of established cities.”131  There is little doubt that the abundance 
of land in the United States encouraged low density development and 
population spread.132  In fact, in the nineteenth century, allocation of land 
served as a vehicle to settle the West and legitimize government authority 
there.133  The focus on low-density development was also evident in the 
“streetcar suburbs” that appeared in the 1880s in the metropolitan areas of 
the Northeast and Midwest.134  An additional impetus for sprawl was the 
overcrowding in the industrial cities of the early twentieth century that 
prompted social reformers and urban planners to push for lower density 
housing outside of the city.135  Indeed, while acknowledging the negative 
impacts of overcrowding, several critics have argued that the urban 
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planners of the early twentieth century often conflated the notions of 
density and overcrowding. 136 
The Department of Commerce’s zoning and planning models of the 
1920s reflected these negative attitudes toward density and expressed a 
firm commitment to low-density development.  Contending that the 
regulation of density is “highly desirable,” the SZEA called for strict limits 
on the number of people per acre and the creation of single-family 
residence districts.137  And, echoing the caution offered by the Supreme 
Court in the Euclid decision that apartment houses destroy the “residential 
character of the neighborhood,”138 the SCPEA also expressed support for 
limiting the number of families in a residential districts.139  The model 
statutes were successful, and suburban developments largely excluded 
multi-family dwellings.140  This emphasis on low-density development, 
with its consequent metropolitan sprawl, was quite evident in the dramatic 
expansion of “bedroom suburbs” in the Northeast and Midwest following 
World War II,141 the emergence of “edge cities” located in previously 
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residential and rural areas in these regions in the 1970s, and the sunbelt 
development of the latter half of the twentieth century.142 
Since the 1920s, then, the pressures for low-density development have 
been channeled through a system of local land-use management inspired by 
the SZEA and SCPEA.143  Local government officials responsible for local 
land-use policy were understandably responsive to the demands of local 
political actors.144  In suburban jurisdictions a critical set of local political 
actors was made up of single-family homeowners focused on preserving 
and enhancing the value of their property investments while minimizing the 
costs of their local tax burdens.145  This goal was best accomplished 
through a land-use policy that excluded uses and people that threatened 
these interests and privileged uses and people that enhanced them.146  In 
wealthier suburban areas, this usually meant excluding multiple-family 
dwellings which attracted lower-income tenants; much too often it also 
meant excluding African Americans.147  On the other hand, it meant 
privileging wealthier groups through the imposition of large-lot and 
minimum house-size regulations, which by raising home prices, attracted a 
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class of desired buyers.148  As a result, over the course of much of the 
twentieth century, outgrowth in metropolitan areas was characterized by 
low-density, single-family home residential areas.149  In the later years of 
the century, exurban development was characterized by mixed residential 
and commercial uses far removed from other cities in metropolitan areas.150  
In the words of one urban scholar, the various growth trends of the 
twentieth century “typically have the effect of legally requiring regional 
sprawl.”151  In short, the combination of widespread undeveloped land, 
negative attitudes toward density, and a locally-controlled land-use 
management system resulted in such a powerful and consistent push for 
population de-concentration that a majority of Americans now live in 
suburban jurisdictions.152 
Population de-concentration is not simply a demographic fact; it has had 
important implications for the way Americans live and the impact of their 
lifestyles on the larger environment.  To make this point, it is useful to 
contrast the American experience of population de-concentration with the 
notion of sustainable development.  Most scholars agree that sustainability 
is enhanced by the kind of high-density development that supports multiple 
land-uses within single communities, encourages walking or mass transit 
use, and limits lot and unit size to conserve energy in the heating and 
cooling of residences.153  Indeed, arguments in favor of high-density 
development have evolved over the years from applauding density for 
encouraging diversity, economic interactions, and vibrant neighborhoods154 
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to insisting that only through increased population concentration can we 
head off a potential climate disaster.155 
Although there is evidence of some movement toward “smart growth” 
initiatives in various communities around the country, the American 
population continues to sprawl.156  And population de-concentration has 
immediate impacts on climate change.  The imposition of large-lot and 
minimum house-size regulations, each of which increases the likelihood of 
extensive travel requiring the use of automobiles, are two examples of the 
land management strategies that enhanced the automobile’s already 
important role in the American economy.157  This reliance on automobile 
travel has led to a situation where per capita consumption of gasoline in the 
United States dwarfs that of other countries.158  As a result, by increasing 
the demand for fossil fuels, metropolitan sprawl has contributed 
substantially to climate change, which now represents an increasingly 
direct threat to the planet generally.159  And by emphasizing more 
libertarian approaches to the Takings Clause, the Lucas decision limits the 
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capacity of state government agencies to control shoreline development, 
thereby protecting the short-term financial investments of individual 
beachfront property owners at the long-term expense of the millions of 
Americans who live in coastal counties of the United States.160 
CONCLUSION 
Policy makers today confront a legacy of environmental problems nearly 
a century in the making.  Following the 1926 Euclid decision, land 
management policy institutions ensured that the relevant stakeholders in 
land-use matters reside in the immediate communities in which each 
particular land-use is found.161  And in 1992, the Supreme Court 
diminished the police powers of the states while enhancing the right to 
private property through its redefinition of the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment.162  As a result, even in policy areas where positive statists 
have their way and state governments directly exercise their police powers 
on behalf of the community, the ability of government to effectuate its 
desired outcome is more questionable than it was before Lucas.  These two 
trends have meant that American land-use policy has largely served 
housing and lifestyle choices which seem rational at face value to those 
who make them, but prove damaging to society at large.163  In other words, 
as a result of these two historical forces, land-use management in the 
United States has evolved into an incubator of the “tragedy of the 
commons.”164 
It has become increasingly clear that the consequences of these 
settlement patterns, manifested most directly in low-density housing, 
metropolitan sprawl, and its accompanying demands on land and energy 
consumption, are socially unsustainable; it is also clear that neither the 
current political nor legal system appears capable of addressing the 
problem.  In a liberal society, the role of policy makers is to create public 
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institutions that mitigate the negative social consequences of individual 
choices and make proactive efforts to reshape the incentive systems that 
constrain individual choices in the first place.  The coupling of locally 
controlled land-use management with an increasingly libertarian legal 
interpretation of real property rights severely limits the creation of such 
institutions. 
